Discussions on climate change and potential mechanisms to support conservation efforts have fixed the attention on incentives to conserve and protect forests. However, incentives alone will not do the job for forest conservation; what might? We use the case of Kutai National Park to examine the potential for incentives to boost conservation and the urgent need to simultaneously apply disincentives against conversion of the park. Kutai National Park is an extreme case: conservation values have to compete with the value of vast deposits of high-grade coal. The park management unit has tried to calculate the conservation benefits derived from the park ecosystem, but these values are miniscule compared to the alternatives of mining and logging. Incentives for encroachment and the conversion of the park are the easily accessible timber and enormous known coal deposits. These resources provide immediate tangible benefits for the settlers in the park and the local government to exploit the park, and affect local possibilities for conserving it. If we are to be serious about conserving important ecosystems, incentives alone are insufficient. Action is needed to ensure that all stakeholders support the national government's commitment to preserve representative examples of biodiversity and ecosystems; each stakeholder will have to make some sacrifices.
Introduction
The discussion on climate change and potential mechanisms to support conservation efforts has focused attention on incentives to conserve and protect forests. One of the best known initiatives aiming to change the approach to protect important biodiversity hotspots, not only as global public goods, but also to benefit those living closest to them, was through the integrated conservation and development programmes (ICDPs). In the late 1990s, ICDPs emerged as the standard component in the new approach to buffer zone and protected area management (Wells et al. 1999) . However, this approach often only achieved one goal -either community development or nature conservation -at relative high expense. Since then, a range of mechanisms has been developed and field-tested to combine the conservation of forests or biodiversity with the short-term needs and demands of local stakeholders, including (see Ferraro and Kiss 2002; Wunder et al. 2005; Wunder 2006 , Wollenberg et al. 2009 ).
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) in developing countries; Direct payment for environmental services (PES); Conservation concessions; Funds disbursed for the clean development mechanism (CDM); Debt for nature swaps (DNS); Grants from international donors; Partnerships with international and national institutions;
Compensation payments for environmental services within the province, based on upstream-downstream agreements; A higher proportion of shared revenues from national and provincial governments; Special allocation funds for conservation districts as an incentive to conserve natural resources.
Many of these approaches try to develop incentive mechanisms to achieve compatibility between development and conservation, ecosystem sustainability, and the empowerment of the local communities (World Bank 1998) .
In contrast to these more recent approaches, the more conventional approach to conserving biodiversity for the public good is based on disincentives through the use of strict protection, fences and armed park guards. This approach is based on laws and regulations declaring protected areas and the protection of endangered species. Often it involves excluding local people from the protected areas. Other strategies linked to such an approach are land-use planning related to designation of protected areas (often without proper stakeholder consultation) and the issuance of permits for large operators, giving them exclusive rights for tourism development in protected areas.
There seems to be a strong divide between these two approaches. On the one hand, the advocates for the traditional park model argue that protection of biodiversity depends on state-established protected areas that prohibit human residence. Others contend that successful conservation can only be achieved by allowing for greater community participation and control over park creation and management decisions (Hayes 2006) . Is it possible to combine the strong points of the two approaches to produce a set of incentives and disincentives that are appropriate to the local conditions and assist in responding to both development and conservation agendas?
In this paper, we will use the case of Kutai National Park, East Kalimantan, Indonesia to examine the potential for incentives to boost conservation and the urgent need for simultaneously applying disincentives against conversion of the national park. Kutai National Park is an extreme case of the impossibility to rely solely on incentives to ensure that various stakeholders support the conservation of a protected area. In this case, the conservation values of the protected area have to compete with the value of vast deposits of high-grade coal underneath it: an estimated total of 2.5 billion tonnes of coal with an estimated total market value of US$92 billion (Departemen Kehutanan 2008).
Methods
The information presented in this article is based on the research programme 'Learning to be responsible: addressing social, economic, and environmental issues for social responsibility of forest-based businesses'. The goal of this programme was to examine how social responsibility programs of businesses in the forest sector can contribute to sustainable forest management and better livelihoods for forest-dependent people. This research was initiated in December 2006 and is still on-going (October 2009). Several members of the research team have been permanently based in the research area. Our approach was designed as an adaptive action research approach, which is essentially a learning approach, following several iterative cycles (Figure 1 ) based on the following activities:
Networking with key stakeholders at regional and national levels; Cooperation with Kutai National Park, local government, natural resource extracting companies and local communities in order to implement effective corporate social responsibility (CSR) and develop the most appropriate legal framework.
Each learning cycle was accompanied by participant observation, interviews, focus group discussions, workshops and participation in meetings with different stakeholders, to collect data and obtain a better understanding of the individual perspectives on the situation and motivation behind actions undertaken. In the course of the work, the process was adjusted to findings in the field, including some additional topics and activities.
The case of Kutai National Park
Kutai National Park is located on the east coast of East Kalimantan ( Figure 2 ) and has an area of 198,629 ha, protected to conserve the unique tropical lowland rainforest species that it contains (especially ironwood and commercially significant dipterocarps). Furthermore the park area has long been renowned for some of its large and unique mammal species (the now extinct rhinoceros, orang-utan, banteng (Bos javanicus), proboscis monkeys, and clouded leopard) and its large number (330) of bird species (BTNK 2005) .
Initially, during the Dutch colonial time, an area of 2 million hectares was proposed as a protected area (BTNK 2005) , but this was quickly reduced to 306,000 ha. Since the 1970s, the protected area has been affected by decisions in favour of national and regional development. The protected area contains coal and oil deposits and, in 1977, the Indonesian Government decided that, in the interest of national development, the state oil company Pertamina could exploit the oil reserves inside the park. Presently, no exploitation of the coal within the park occurs and status of permits for coal exploration remains unclear. Subsequently, a natural gas liquefier plant and a fertilizer plant were built on the southern border of the park on an area which was removed from the protected area. Moeliono and Purwanto (2008) provide a more comprehensive description of the history of Kutai National Park. These developments resulted in additional pressure on the protected area, due to the increased migration of people from other parts of Indonesia to this area. These people regarded the area as offering economic opportunities, and the protected area as offering free land. These events (and also the devastating forest fires in 1982/1983 and 1997/1998 ) have caused substantial damage to the ecosystem of the protected area. This in turn has increasingly given rise to debates as to whether the protected area still has conservation value, or that alternative uses of the area would provide greater benefit to society as a whole. At one point, there was discussion about the possibility to use an offset policy; i.e. to excise some of the park already occupied by people and replace this by an area of similar size and quality. However, no appropriate area to enable the offset has been identified.
In reaction to these questions, the park management unit has tried to calculate the conservation benefits derived from the park ecosystems (BTNK 2006) . These values are miniscule compared to the alternative of mining. The potential environmental services or non-destructive use of resources within the protected area that are most obvious at present include:
Protection of watershed and water supply; Biodiversity (220 species of medicinal plants); Direct non-destructive use of natural resources (leaves for thatch, sugar palm, mangrove seedlings, swiftlet birds' nests); Permits for research in the protected area; Development of tourism; Payment for reduced carbon emission from avoided deforestation and degradation.
The only service for which a monetary value could be estimated was for water supply used by the nearby town of Sangatta (54,069 persons) and its surroundings (14,390 persons) (BPS 2008) . The amount is approximately 1.13 billion rupiah (approx. US$125,000) per year at the present market value. It can be predicted that the annual demand for water will grow steadily as Sangatta further develops.
A second option would be a REDD scheme related to reducing the deforestation inside the park. The historical rate of deforestation in the park, from 1994 until now, has been approximately 3000 ha per year. A conservative aim for reduced deforestation would be 1000 ha per year. Table 1 provides an estimate for the net present value, calculated using a 30-year time horizon based on the present guidelines for REDD (Cortez and Stephen 2009) . Two carbon prices were used: a low carbon price (US$5 per tonne) and an intermediate one (US$15 tonne). The average figure of 200 tonnes C/ha is used (see for example Garzuglia and Saket 2003; de Bruijn 2005; Rahayu et al. 2005) . To realise these payments, further baseline data will be needed: What area is under threat of further degradation and degradation? Who has to be involved to ensure that the scheme will succeed? In addition, mechanisms will have to be developed to ensure that the target reduction can be achieved. This will be timeconsuming and have high transaction costs, as it will involve several key stakeholders (communities inside and on the periphery of the park, district government, provincial government, park management unit and the Ministry of Forestry).
In contrast, the main incentives for encroachment or even conversion of the national park are the easily accessible timber and known enormous coal deposits, which are both (fairly) easily marketable. These resources provide an immediate tangible benefit for the settlers in the park and the local government to exploit the park. The area that the local government proposed to be excised (about 23,000 ha) contains an estimated 2.5 billion tonnes of coal (Departemen Kehutanan). Even if this were to be exploited at a low rate over 30 years, the production would still be a minimum of 500,000 tonnes per year. To calculate the net present value (NPV), a price of US$50 per tonne was used (below the present world market price).
If we look at the value of illegal timber, the present market price for timber is approximately Rp. 2,000,000 per m 3 (US$200/m 3 ). People are extracting timber from the forest edges as well as recovering any remaining timber (especially ironwood) in the areas that have already been cleared. Recently, illegal timber has been processed into construction materials, such as doorposts and window frames. Field observations and interviews with park staff lead to the conclusion that 17 units are presently (illegally) operating inside the national park, each processing approx. 0.5m 3 per day and operating approximately 50% of the year. This means that a total of over 1000 m 3 timber with a market value of 2 billion rupiah (approx. US$200,000) is processed annually. These amounts are higher than the value of water consumed in Sangatta and its surroundings. In addition, the illegal logging involves and benefits many people, whereas payment for water supplies goes to the state water facility.
Land speculation is another source of substantial amounts of money. Despite the fact that the plots of land have no official papers, and sale of land in a national park is illegal, the present market value of plots of land, especially along the main road, is between 8 and 12 million rupiah per hectare. If there is no drastic change in enforcement, some 100 ha will be sold annually. At present prices, this is worth approximately 1 billion rupiahs (US$100,000), and the price for land can be expected to continue to rise as people consider it a lucrative way of saving surplus cash. Land speculation is also fuelled by stories from other parts in East Kalimantan where coal mine companies paid compensation for land acquisition at rates of 35-100 million rupiah per hectare -as well as the knowledge that Kutai National Park also contains coal. Table 1 combines the potential revenues from these various sources. For comparison, the NPV has been calculated, using a 30-year timeframe. For water and carbon this is realistic; for the other sources of revenue, the timeframe might actually be shorter, which would increase the NPV even further. Table 1 illustrates that the amounts of direct benefits derived from the presence of the park are, in monetary value, small compared to the exploitation of park. Although water is vital to the town of Sangatta, it has the lowest value. Even if, in the future, the park is able to develop a REDD scheme and carbon prices increase, the NPV is still below that of (illegal) timber extraction or coal mining. These large differences in values mean that many stakeholders favour the conversion of Kutai National Park to other uses from which they can quickly obtain personal financial gains.
To further elaborate on incentives and disincentives for the main stakeholders to engage with conservation efforts or to convert the park, Table 2 considers personal financial gains, potential impact on careers and public image. Incentives for conservation are shown as white rows, and incentives for conversion in grey. Table 3 presents the disincentives in a similar way. Table 2 shows that there are very limited incentives for individual stakeholders to support conservation, even for government staff with the specific task of safeguarding the national park. This was also noted by a progressive senior official in the Ministry of Forestry when he mentioned the importance of career planning, especially for national park staff as they are the institutional memory of the park management unit (Wiratno 2005) . He also acknowledged that, at On the other hand, several key stakeholders (especially the district government) have important incentives to support conversion of the national park. One very important incentive has been that the promise to excise part of the park for the benefit of the local people is popular with voters. A local NGO that has been engaged with the park management for the last 10 years observed that, in every year there are local elections, the rate of encroachment increases significantly. A financial incentive for conversion is that plots of land inside the park can be occupied with little cost and with potentially significant gains. We came across several cases of relatively well-off people 'investing' money in land inside the park. Table 3 emphasizes that there are few disincentives to dissuade people to convert the park. The main disincentives for conservation are that it does not earn people money, or increases their career opportunities and has little impact on public image.
We will now examine what mix of incentives and disincentives might provide the appropriate impetus to change the tide for the national park. Serious efforts to conserve important ecosystems in national parks and other protected areas cannot rely on incentives. Kutai National Park is an extreme example of how much local stakeholders can financially gain from abandoning the park and how few incentives there are in support of conservation. One important disincentive for the conversion of protected areas should be the certainty that most violations will be dealt with firmly and result in punishment. Because of the personal gains, key local stakeholders want to maintain the status quo and emphasize the complexity and difficulties involved in improving law enforcement and park management. Some (political) pressure and force might be needed to ensure that all stakeholders support the national government's commitment to preserve representative examples of biodiversity and ecosystems. Each stakeholder will have to make some sacrifice: e.g. settlers inside the national park will have limited development options; local government have to agree to set aside some area that cannot be 'developed'; and the national government will have to provide subsidies as incentives to local stakeholders and ensure law enforcement.
Discussion
Since decentralisation was implemented in Indonesia, many local governments have regarded conservation and protected areas as a burden for their areas, hindering development and not as a valuable asset important for long-term development (Wollenberg et al. 2009 ). Their vision of development is based on narrow economic considerations and, even if the managers of protected areas can present clear figures on direct economic values derived from these areas, it is difficult to convince local government decision makers of their importance. From the example of Kutai National Park, we agree with Norton and Noonan (2007: 2) that
Even if one grants -and we believe the jury is still out on this question -that placing dollar values on ecosystem services can be rhetorically effective, we still worry that the discipline of ecological economics is being swept by a tide of dollar-valuations toward a monistic methodology of estimating and aggregating benefits in dollar terms only. As the case of Kutai National Park shows, the valuation of the ecosystem services are far outweighed by direct other economic uses of the area. The valuation does not capture important 'ecological values' -the whole range of values that humans derive from ecological systems, including services, provision of material resources, aesthetic values attributed to pristine and/or healthy systems, recreation, spiritual, and the biodiversity with potential value (Pimbert and Pretty 1995; IUCN 1998; Norton and Noonan 2007) .
The decision about the best use of a public good, such as Kutai National Park, cannot only rely on economic analysis (IUCN 2004 ). Schaeffer (2007) concludes that market prices do not result in optimal allocation if the resource has the characteristic of a public good or a common pool good. Actors interested in converting the national park are likely to use arguments of market prices and benefits in terms of economic development to society, as these data are readily available. If those arguing for the conservation of Kutai National Park try to counter these arguments using the same approach, they will surely lose the argument -as our calculations above demonstrate. Therefore, the national government will have to reassert its authority to ensure that representative examples of important ecosystems and their biodiversity, such as Kutai National Park, are protected for the common good. One important step would be to start with law enforcement, to counterbalance the economic incentives with legal disincentives. Good policies and laws are one aspect of providing disincentives for conversion or destruction of protected areas by a range of actors. What has often been lacking, however, is the implementation of these policies. In Indonesia's Gunung Leuser National Park, the park management unit carefully identified the actors behind the scenes supporting encroachment and illegal logging. Once these actors were identified, firm action was taken against them. The influence of these key actors was proven when their arrest just before a popular demonstration resulted in the cancellation of this demonstration (Wiratno, pers. comm. 6 March 2008) .
The case of Kutai National Park and, for example, also Bukit Barisan Selatan National Park, Sumatra, Indonesia (see Yonazira and Webb 2007) , shows that lack of law enforcement rapidly leads to escalation of problems and to increased opportunities for powerful actors to try to achieve their goal of converting a national park for their personal benefit. They create the public opinion that conservation areas illustrate the arrogance of the national government in continuing to interfere with local interest and that conservation areas result in lost economic opportunities. Often the popular argument is used: of providing opportunities to poor farmers by allowing to them to encroach into national parks.
It is only when pressure is put onto influential actors to at least honour, if not actively support, the conservation of national parks for the public good, that discussions can start on appropriate incentives. In Kutai National Park, the work by a local NGO, Yayasan Bina Kelola Lingkungan (BIKAL) with some farmers groups inside the park has shown encouraging results (Ali 2007) . Facilitated by the NGO, a range of stakeholders, such as the park management unit and some private companies, cooperated to reverse the trend of mangrove destruction through the rehabilitation of mangroves. This also resulted in providing an alternative source of income for the farmer group involved, by selling mangrove seedlings for rehabilitation programs elsewhere. Through these activities, the farmers started to appreciate that their environment had a direct value to them, and became supporters of better conservation of the national park. In monetary terms, these activities have a value only a fraction of that of timber or coal. However, to the farmers occupying land inside the park, the amount is significant, and provides an incentive to care for the conservation of the park. Other incentives can be offered by providing:
(1) (More) secured rights to use certain plots of land to support a decent livelihood; (2) Support for improved agricultural development e.g. technical advice and provision of seeds/seedlings; (3) Alternative sources of livelihood that are less or not damaging to the protected area.
Another means to increase support for the conservation of protected areas is collaboration between different actors. This increases the sense of ownership and opportunities to discuss the appropriate set of incentives and disincentives, including the development of rules that are recognized and based on negotiation between key stakeholders. Rather than solely depending on the official designation as a protected area, it is the rules in use by residents that influence the actual protection. To promote long-term conservation of the protected area, the (local) people should be included in the rule-making processes (Hayes 2006) . These privileges (e.g. more secured rights) and support (e.g. technical advice) can be linked to an active role in protecting the area (by reporting, joint patrols, etc.). Sanctions for individuals not sticking to the rules also have to be developed as a deterrent.
Conclusions
National parks and other protected areas provide important public goods. Many local stakeholders take these services for granted and focus on their direct personal benefits/gains from the national park. In the absence of law enforcement and environmental awareness, financial incentives for conversion are huge. We agree with the conclusion reached by Sodhi et al. (2008) that, if conservation areas are to survive, better protection is needed. The question remains: how can better protection be achieved? What set of incentives and disincentives can be employed by key stakeholders to increase the chances that Kutai National Park and other protected areas have a future and significance for the future of the people living closest to them?
First of all, disincentives for conversion and destruction of the park through law enforcement have to be increased. This will result in minimizing the threats to protected areas. This includes not only patrolling the area, but also investigating and prosecution of illegal acts 1 focusing on the people behind the scenes, and punishment for park staff involved in, or backing, illegal activities. This will result in increased risks for actors to link their name, influence and capital to enterprises that destroy the park. At the same time, there is a need to increase incentives for conservation. This includes the commitment of some key actors, especially in the Ministry of Forestry and in local government, to put a greater effort into protecting the areas that have been set aside for conservation: such as budget allocation, staffing and career planning, and appreciation of efforts by staff in the field. This mix of incentives and disincentives will require and enable increased collaboration between the park management unit, local government, people residing in the park, and must be supported by companies operating adjacent to the park and local NGOs/universities. In developing collaboration, two broad scenarios can be presented to people in the protected area: changing behaviour and cooperation to sustainably use and rehabilitate part of the park area (including incentives related to these actions); or the risk of expulsion or legal action against them (disincentives for conversion).
Although most people agree that repressive management of protected areas is not appropriate any more, the long-term survival of Kutai National Park and other parks in Indonesia requires some firm action leading to the development of an appropriate set of incentives (and disincentives) and cooperation between key stakeholders.
